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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the employer had just cause for

terminating the claimant from his employment.
2.

Whether the claimant was able and available

for employment during the week ending January 12, 1985.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 14, 1985, the Department of Employment
Security denied unemployment insurance benefits effective
December 30, 1984 because it determined that the claimant
was discharged for just cause.

(R. 0088) On January 21,

1985, the Department denied compensation for the week ending

January 12, 1985 on the grounds that the claimant was not
available for work.

(R. 0085)

After a hearing, the Admin-

istrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) affirmed both determinations

(R. 0011-13, 0056-58)

The Board of Review of the

Industrial Commission concurred with the ALJ's opinion in a
2-1 decision.

(R. 0009-010, 0035-36)

The claimant

requested reconsideration by the Board, but his petition was
refused.

(R. 0007, 0021)
The claimant asks this court to reverse the

decision of the Board of Review and order payment of unemployment compensation for the weeks benefits were denied.
In the alternative, the claimant seeks a remand to the ALJ
for the purposes of taking testimony concerning the matters
set forth in Rule A71-07-2: Able and Available, Section
150.15.
The claimant was employed by Paper, Calmenson and
Company from August 27, 1985 until he lost his job on
November 9, 1985.

(R. 0011)

The reasons for his discharge

were alleged excessive absenteeism and poor attitude.
0093)

(R.

After termination, the claimant applied for unem-

ployment compensation.

(R. 0095)

The Department of Employment Security denied the
claimant's request for benefits (R. 0088), and the ALJ
affirmed this decision.

(R. 0011-13, 0056-58)

He believed

that the absences were excusable, but determined that the
2

claimant's attitude adversely affected the company.
0012, 0057)

(R.

This led him to conclude that the discharge was

for just cause and, consequently, the application for
compensation was denied.

Id.

For the week ending January 12, 1985, the ALJ
determined that there was a different reason for refusing
benefits.

The claimant left his home in Panguitch for

approximately thirty six hours to attend his grandmother's
funeral in Grand Junction, Colorado.

(R. 0078)

This

absence from the labor market, according to the ALJ, rendered the claimant unavailable to accept work.
0057-58)

(R. 0012-13,

Compensation was denied on this basis as well.

(R. 0013, 0058)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

Under Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A)2 adopted by

the court in Kehl v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm., 700
P.2d 1129 (Ut. 1985), an employee may be denied unemployment
benefits if his employer had just cause in terminating him.
Just cause is premised on a finding of fault and requires
consideration of three elements:
control.

culpability, knowledge and

When the claimantfs actions are considered under

this standard, a finding of just cause is not supported by
substantial evidence.

Sufficient evidence was not

etablished to show a serious effect on the employer's

3

rightful interests. Further, the evidence does not show
that the claimant had clear knowledge that his actions would
result in his termination.
B.

The ALJ failed to properly consider whether

the claimant was able and available for work during the week
of January 12, 1985. The ALJ considered only whether
claimant was physically present and did not look at other
circumstantial factors required by relevant case law.
ARGUMENT
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S BOARD OF
REVIEW ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ALJ'S
DETERMINATION THAT THE CLAIMANT
WAS DISCHARGED FOR JUST CAUSE.
The claimant was denied unemployment compensation
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(2)(a)(Interim Sup..
1984), which renders ineligible those who have been discharged for "just cause11.

Ld.

The ALJ held that this

statute disposed of the benefits claim because the claimant's
termination was justified.

(F. 0012, 0057) The

Board of Review affirmed the result.

(R. 0009, 0035)

This decision of the Industrial Commission is
subject to a two-pronged standard of review.

Reversal is

warranted where two requirements have been satisfied.

Gocke

V. Wiesley, 18 U.2d 245, 248, 420 P.2d 44, 45 (1966).
First, there must be proof that substantial evidence does

4

not support the decision below.

Denby v. Board of Review of

the Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 626, 628 (Ut. 1977).
Second, the record must clearly and persuasively establish a
right to compensation, rendering the refusal to make an
award "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable."

Continental

Oil Co. v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 568
P.2d 727, 729 (Ut. 1977).
The present appeal involves an examination of the
ALJ's rationale for his decision.
the claimant

His determination that

was discharged for "just cause" should be

evaluated with reference to the legal definition of that
term.

Such a comparison will reveal the error of the

disposition below.
At the time of the ALJ!s determination, no
authoritive definition of just cause existed.

There was

merely a proposed administrative provision interpreting the
term.

This regulation was eventually adopted as the common

law standard in Kehl v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission, supra, but only after the administrative
decision became final.
Although the provisions of the proposed regulation
were not in effect at the time of the hearing, they still
should control the outcome of the present appeal. Two
reasons justify this conclusion.
pertinent rule of law in Utah.
5

First, there is no other
If reference to the

administrative interpretation is foreclosed, then a
significant tool of construction would be lost.

Second, and

more important, the terms of the proposed regulation provide
a reasonable and rational interpretation of the phrase "just
cause,"

Kehl, supra, at 1134. There is no logical reason

for declining use of the rule.
The proposed definition states that the just cause
requirement is satisfied by a finding of fault.
Rule A71-07-l:5(A)2.

Proposed

Fault is composed of three elements,

culpability, knowledge and control. An explanation of each
of these components is set forth in the rule.

It provides:

The basic factors which establish fault
and are essential to a determination
of ineligibility under the definition of
just cause are:
a. Culpability. This is the
seriousness of the conduct as it
affects the continuance of the
employment relationship. The discharge
must have been necessary to avoid
actual or potential harm to the
employer's rightful interests. A
discharge would not be considered
necessary if it is not consistent with
reasonable employment practices.
The wrongness of the conduct must
be considered in the context of the
particular employment and how it
affects the employer's rights. If the
conduct was an isolated incident of
poor judgment and there is no expectation that the conduct will be
continued or repeated, potential harm
may not be shown and, therefore, it is
not necessary to discharge the employee.
6

b. Knowledge. The employee
must have had a knowledge of the
conduct which the employer expected.
It is not necessary that the claimant
intended to cause harm to the
employer, but he should reasonably
have been able to anticipate the
effect his conduct would have.
Knowledge may not be established
unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or had a
pertinent written policy, except in the
case of a flagrant violation of a
universal standard of behavior. If
the employer's expectations are unclear,
ambiguous or inconsistent, the existence
of knowledge is not shown. A specific
warning is one way of showing that the
employee had knowledge of the expected
conduct. After the employee is given
a warning, he should be given an opportunity
to correct objectionable conduct.
Additional violations occurring after the
warning would be necessary to establish
just cause for discharge.
c. Control. The conduct must have
been within the power and capacity of the
claimant to control or prevent.
The ALJ determined that discharge in the present
case was justified because the crlaimantf s attitude injured
the employer's interests.
to support this conclusion.

(R. 0057)

Two reasons were cited

First, the claimant "often

complained or questioned his job assignments", according to
the ALJ, and second, he disputed instructions given by his
supervisor.

(R. 0057)

The ALJ concluded that this

"questionable attitude" "could have an adverse effect on the
attitudes of the other workers."

(R. 0057)

These reasons

should be scrutinized according to the requirements set
7

forth in Proposed Rule A71-07-l:5A which requires proof of
the

claimant1 s culpability, knowledge and control.
A careful review of the somewhat confusing record

discloses that substantial evidence was not identified by
the ALJ to support the two key findings of culpability and
knowledge.

The employer alleges generally that the claimant

had a "negative attitude"

(R. 0063), but has failed to

prove the seriousness of the claimant's alleged actions.
There is a paucity of credible evidence to show that claimant's alleged complaining or questioning caused any actual
or potential harm to the employer's rightful interests.
Further, as the claimant ably demonstrated at the hearing,
the employer's own rules invited employees to "talk over
frankly" with their supervisor any job-connected problems.
(R. 0065)

The employer failed to show that claimant's frank

discussions of his job-related problems had any harmful
effect at all.

The substance of the employer's evidence

consists of general accusations, all of which were denied by
the claimant and countered effectively by his own affirmative evidence.
Further, the employer's general allegations do not
demonstrate that the claimant acted knowingly.

The

knowledge element requires proof that the employee "should
reasonably have been able to anticipate the effect his
conduct would have."

Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A)3(b). It
8

is only satisfied when the employer has given a clear,
unambiguous and consistent explanation of expected behavior.
Id.

Otherwise, knowledge is not shown.

The messages

received by the claimant were not of this nature. The
record contains evidence of two instances which amply prove
this point.
First, as noted above, the employee handbook
strongly encouraged frank discussion with the foreman
regarding "any condition that might be a problem."
0065)

(R.

The claimant followed this counsel and freely raised

his concerns.

(R. 0065-66)

Yet upon doing so, he was

condemned by his employer as being argumentative.

(R. 0066)

These contradictory messages disprove knowledge.
Second, the warnings given to the claimant failed
to adequately notify him of his shortcomings.

He testified

that his supervisor rarely, if ever, communicated evaluations of his performance to him

(R. 0068, 0075) and when

he was told, the language used was too vague.

The only

written warning the claimant received stated, "Dalefs
quality is not as expected.
negative side."

(R. 0063)

His attitude has been on the
This message does not specif-

ically indicate, or even imply, the type of improvement
needed.

If anything, it downplays the seriousness of the

alleged attitude problem.

Moreover, the claimant's foreman

testified that his verbal warnings were almost identical to
9

the written one.
defective.

(R. 0076)

All notices, therefore, were

The claimant could not have known what his

employer expected.
Like his general allegations, the employer's
reference to a specific instance of conduct fails to
demonstrate that the claimant acted culpably.

At the

hearing, the employer claimed that his employee began to
"throw heat treat hanging fixtures around."

(R. 0069)

This

conduct, according to the supervisor, was "dangerous" and
"hostile."

(R. 0069)

allegation.

The claimant specifically denied this

Further, the record* contains no evidence

indicating what effect, if any, these actions had on other
employees or on the employer's rightful interests.
The second finding of the ALJ concerns the claimant1 s inability to follow directions.

(R. 0012, 0057)

This

determination is probably based on a painting incident
raised by the employer at the hearing.

The claimant had

been painting, and, according to his supervisor, had spread
the coats too thickly.

(R. 0068)

Upon being notified of

his error, he adjusted his technique and reduced the amount
of paint applied.

(R. 0069)

This proved unsatisfactory,

however, because the claimant later received complaints that
each coat was too thin.

(R. 0069)

The employer claimed

that the employee maliciously overcompensated.
0075)

(R. 0069,

The claimant contends, however, that he merely made
10

an unintentional mistake.

His supervisor failed to show him

how to paint correctly (R. 0069) so the claimant was left to
determine in good faith the amount of paint needed.

It

cannot be said that the claimant could reasonably anticipate
the defects in his performance when he was not instructed
how to paint properly.
The third finding of the ALJ concerns the effect
of the claimant's attitude on employee morale.

The ALJ

determined that the claimant's argumentative disposition
could spread to other employees and, thus, injure the
employer's interests.

(R. 0012, 0057)

this justified termination.

He believed that

(R. 0012, 0057)

however, does not support such a finding.

The record,

There is no

evidence to suggest that the culpability requirement of the
proposed rule has been fulfilled.
The culpability element relates to the seriousness
of the worker's misconduct.

It is satisfied when the

discharge is "necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to
the employer's rightful interests."
A71~07-l:5(A)3(a).

Proposed Rule

In the present appeal, there is little

in the record which even relates to the employer's position
on the morale issue.

The manager stated that the claimant

sometimes complained to other employees.

(R. 0068) The

supervisor testified that workers believed the claimant had
a bad attitude.

(R. 0075)

However, no written or oral
11

evidence of this allegation was produced by the employer.
These comments do not indicate that the employees were
bothered or influenced by the claimant.

It only states that

they noticed he complained about his job.

The record, then,

contains no evidence which shows that the employer was
subject to actual or potential harm in the form of injury to
employee morale.
There is proof, on the other hand, which demonstrates that the claimant positively influenced other
workers with whom he associated.

The claimant testified

that he had good relations with his co-workers.

(R. 0075)

This opinion was corroborated by other employees. One
fellow worker complained to the plant manager about the
claimant's unjust discharge.

(R. 0076)

Two others wrote

letters to the Board of Review stating that the claimant was
a helpful co-worker who did not adversely affect employee
morale.

(R. 0042-45)
The ALJ disputed these statements of fellow

employees, claiming they did not disprove the potential ill
effect of the claimant's attitude.

He believed that this

evidence only demonstrated the ability of the claimant to
"get along" with his co-workers personally.

(R. 0012, 0057)

The claimant submits that the ALJ's reasoning on this point
is flawed.

An employee cannot maintain an affinity with

co-workers and at the same time injure their morale. Work
12

activity is so intertwined with the personal relationships
between employees that a worker could not be well liked by
those whose attitudes he is supposedly damaging.

If the

claimant was spreading negative feelings around the plant,
then his fellow employees would have shunned him and would
not have voiced their complaints about his discharge.
A careful review of the record shows that the
findings of the ALJ were not established with respect to the
argumentativeness and insubordination allegations, and the
record fails to demonstrate that culpability was involved in
the employee morale charge.

There being no basis for

denying unemployment compensation, it follows that the
refusal to make an award was arbitrary, capricious and
unreasonable.

An order entitling claimant to benefits is

warranted.
POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S BOARD
OF REVIEW ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
ALJfS DENIAL OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION FOR THE WEEK ENDING
JANUARY 12, 1985.
The claimant was denied unemployment compensation
for the week ending January 12, 1985.

(R. 0013, 0035)

The

ALJ attributed his ineligibility to unavailability for work.
(R. 0013)

Kay was out of the Panguitch labor market for

more than one day, and, therefore, could not immediately
accept full-time employment. jEd. This, according to the
13

ALJ, was the disqualifying factor.

Id.. On appeal, the

ALJ's determination was affirmed by the Board of Review of
the Industrial Commission.

(R. 0035)•

This decision of the Industrial Commission is
subject to a dichotomous standard of review.
warranted when two requirements are satisfied.

Reversal is
Gocke v.

Wiesley, 18 U.2d 245, 248, 420 P.2d 44, 45 (1966).

First,

there must be proof that no substantial evidence sustains
the earlier decision.

Denby v. Board of Review of the

Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 626, 628 (Ut. 1977).
Additionally, the record must clearly and persuasively
establish a right to compensation, rendering the refusal to
make an award "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable."
Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission, 568 P.2d 727, 729 (Ut. 1977).
The present appeal involves an examination of Utah
Code Ann. §35-4-4 (c) (Supp. 1983).

It provides:

An unemployed individual shall be eligible
to receive benefits with respect to any
week only if it has been found by the
commission that:...(c) He is able
to work and is available for work
during each and every week with
respect to which he made a claim
for benefits under this act...
This passage indicates that an applicant's eligibility for benefits is conditioned on his availability for
work.

The term "available" means being "genuinely attached

14

to the labor market."

Denby, 567 P.2d at 628.

It focuses

on the subjective attitude of the claimant, i.e. whether he
wants to go to work. JEd. However, a reasonable appraisal
of the objective facts and circumstances involved should
serve to establish the applicant's disposition.

Lauder v.

board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 29 U.2d 121,
122, 506 P.2d 50, 51 (1973).
This emphasis on objective measures of attitude is
reflected in a regulation enacted by the Department of
Employment Security.

It provides additional guidance as to

the meaning of the availability requirement:
Absence from the claimant's labor market area
results in a conclusion of nonavailability
if the individual is restricted for more
than one full working day within the
customary work week of Monday through
Friday excluding business holidays.
For these purposes "one full working
day" means from 8a.m. to 5 p.m.
For example, if the individual is absent
from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. or less in
one day, benefits would not be denied.
If the period continues into the 8 a.m.
to 5 p.m. period or beyond in the next
day or another day of the same
week, benefits would be denied.
Rule A71-07-2: Able and Available,
Section 150.15.
This section appears to focus on physical presence.
Availability under the regulation is determined by whether
the claimant remains within the job market or travels to
areas outside it.

15

Presence in a particular locale, however, is not
the sole factor involved in establishing availability.

A

claimant who remains away from the labor market for more
than a full working day has not necessarily invalidated his
unemployment compensation claim.

Jld. Absence is only one

of several factors to be considered.

Others include the

reasons for leaving, the possibility of accepting employment
while outside the labor market, the genuineness of attempts
to obtain employment and the efforts made to maintain
contact with the employment area while away.

Id.

The administrative rule and the Denby and Lauder
opinions indicate that the availability requirement has a
circumstantial focus. Although the subjective disposition
of the claimant is of primary importance, objective factors
will be used to determine his attitude.

Presence or absence

with respect to a particular area is only one matter of
consideration.
The ALJ erred as a matter of law in the instant
case by failing to recognize the circumstantial focus of the
availability requirement.

The record indicates that he was

only concerned with claimant's presence in Panguitch.
During the hearing, the ALJ noted that it would be impossible for an individual to be available for work when he is
away from his residence for over twenty-four hours (R. 0079)
and in his decision the ALJ stated:
16

"[T]he claimant had been out of his
normal labor market area for more
than one customary workday and he
was not immediately available to
accept full-time work." (R. 0013)
It is clear that the ALJ considered no factors other than
physical presence in determining Kay's availability for
work.

Consequently, the Board's decision on this point

should be reversed and an order issued directing the ALJ to
consider all matters set forth in the rule.
The claimant submits, however, that remand for
additional findings is unnecessary.

While the ALJ did not

expressly elicit from Kay information concerning the factors
mentioned in the regulation, the record contains clear proof
that the claimant was immediately available to accept work.
He left Panguitch for more than a full working day, but the
circumstances surrounding his departure are proof of a
proper, work-seeking attitude.
Kay left Panguitch for Grand Junction, Colorado to
attend his grandmotherfs funeral.

(R. 0078)

Every aspect

of the trip was planned to assure his availability for work.
He departed at noon on January 8; but only after applying
for Park Service employment and waiting in vain at the Job
Service office for notice of other openings.

(R. 0079-80)

Upon his return the following evening, Kay was contacted by
a Job Service worker and informed of positions that became

17

available during his absence,

(R. 0079)

demanded immediate attention.

Id.

None of them

These facts surrounding Kay's trip parallel the
matters mentioned in the administrative regulation.

Kay's

reason for leaving was to attend his grandmother's funeral.
He was net on a frolic.

His efforts to obtain work were

genuine because he departed only after attempting to take
advantage of every possible availability and he arranged to
be immediately notified of job openings which arose during
his absence.

Moreover, it is likely that Kay's trip did not

prevent him from accepting employment because the record
suggests that no positions opened and closed while he was
away.
The ALJ's opinion is incorrect on these facts, and
the Board's affirmance is improper.

There is no substantial

evidence to sustain its finding because when circumstantial
evidence is considered, it should be concluded that Kay was
available to accept work.

The ALJ's sole emphasis on

physical presence was arbitrary, capricious and
unreasonable.

The Board should have overturned this aspect

of the ALJ's decision.

Consequently, an award of benefits

for the week ending January 12, 1985 should not be denied
because of unavailability.

18

CONCLUSION
Substantial evidence was not developed at the
hearing to establish just cause for claimant's termination
and for the finding that he was not able and available for
work.

For these reasons stated, the decision of the Board

of Review should be reversed and benefits granted.
Alternatively, the cause should be remanded for a new
hearing.
DATED this /£

day of September, 1985.

STEPHEN W. JULIAN
Attorney for Claimant/Petitioner
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